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Abstract 
 
Previous studies found that the impact of intelligence (IQ) on productivity is larger at 
country level than at individual level. Labor works in clusters at the country level, and 
therefore, the effect of individual skill complementarities collectively magnifies per capita 
income at the national level, which is consistent with the O-ring theory of economic 
development. The main feature of the O-ring theory is positive assortative matching, in which 
individuals can augment productivity per capita when they team up with other individuals 
with equivalent levels of skills. We investigated whether global integration would intensify 
this impact owing to global interconnectivity of skills and intellectual ideas. By extending the 
O-ring theory, we examined the role of economic globalization (i.e., actual flows and 
restrictions), social globalization (i.e., personal contact, information flows, and cultural 
proximity), and political globalization in moderating the impact of national IQ on the 
economic growth of more than 110 countries during 1970–2010. The results of our 
hierarchical multiple regressions suggest that IQ rather than economic, political, or social 
globalization has the strongest impact on economic growth. Moreover, moderation analysis 
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revealed that globalization has reduced the impact of national IQ on economic growth at the 
cross-country level. We suggest that within the context of globalization, friction was present 
in the matching market and cognitive skill-sorting inefficiencies, which reduced the collective 
impact of IQ on economic growth.  
 
Keywords:  National IQ, collective IQ, economic growth, globalization, positive assortative 
matching.  
JEL Classifications: D7, F62, I25, J24, O47 
 
1. Introduction  
Previous studies have been concerned with the direct impact on economic growth of 
national average intelligence (IQ), that is, cognitive ability and skills. The studies have 
concluded that countries with higher IQs generate higher productivity than countries with 
lower IQs (e.g., Burhan, Mohamad, Kurniawan, & Sidek, 2014a; Jones & Schneider, 2006; 
Lynn & Vanhanen, 2002, 2006, 2012; Meisenberg, 2012; Rindermann, 2012; Rindermann & 
Thompson, 2011; Weede & Kämpf, 2002). As the IQ–productivity relationship is robust, 
some other recent studies have established that it is possible to increase per capita national 
income by raising the impact of IQ on productivity through the O-ring effect of skill 
complementarities. Accordingly, with diverse levels of IQ distributed within a country, when 
individual laborers with equivalent levels of cognitive skills work in groups, they are inclined 
to cooperate through positive assortative matching, resulting in magnified per capita 
productivity (Jones, 2011a, 2011b, 2013; Kremer, 1993). For this reason, the impact of IQ on 
productivity is larger at cross-country level than at individual level (e.g., Hanushek & Kimko, 
2000; Jones & Schneider, 2010).  
Assortative matching occurs naturally in humans.
1
 Arcand and Fafchamps (2012) 
found positive assortative matching in social attributes, such as proximity between ethnicity 
                                                 
1
 Positive assortative matching theory is comparable with ―assortative mating‖ in population genetics, that is, 
non-random mating patterns in which individuals with similar characteristics (genotypes and/or phenotypes) 
tend to mate among each another more frequently than one would expect with random mating (disassortative 
mating), thereby raising the proportion of the same traits (homozygotes) (Raven, Johnson, Mason, Losos, & 
Singer, 2011, pp. 401–402). Assortative mating strengthens the mating bond to increase fertility and raises 
genetic relatedness, which assists communication and altruism, thereby increasing total fitness of a family unit 
to ensure stability in predictable environments (Wolf & Figueredo, 2011). Assortative mating in human beings 
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and wealth among affiliates in community-based organizations at cross-country level. 
Positive assortative matching implies that the probability of success between two partners is 
positively correlated (Gavrilova, 2014). The idea of assortative matching in productivity was 
proposed by Shapley and Shubik (1972) and Becker (1973), in which firms are inclined to 
match highest ability individuals to the most sophisticated and highest paying ventures 
(Abowd, Kramarz, & Margolis, 1999). Becker (1973) and Pencavel (1998) focused on 
marriage markets and established that in a household production, it is optimum to pair men 
and women with similar traits. In a labor market within an industry, such positive assortative 
matching corresponds to matching highly skilled agents with firms that employ the most 
sophisticated technology (Albrecht & Vroman, 2002). In addition, with numerous types of 
agents, the market performs a sorting function, where agents have manifold chances to pair 
with their complementary peers (Damiano, Li, & Suen, 2005). In academia, for example, co-
authorships are organized by teaming up with a partner who is comparatively good at 
publishing articles, hence, producing a trend of positive assortative matching (Gavrilova, 
2014). This is consistent with Bagues and Perez-Villadoniga (2012), who showed that in a 
natural experiment, recruiters favor candidates who are equivalent to their own assortment of 
skills to work together as a team. Since the assortative matching occurs only through 
cognitive ability, in the labor market, a worker lacking social skills but possessing excellent 
cognitive ability may nonetheless have a high wage (McCann, Shi, Siow, & Wolthoff, 2012). 
At global level, the O-ring effect of assortative matching of skills has taken place among 
firms of different countries. For example, Davidson, Matusz, and Shevchenko (2008), 
Davidson, Heyman, Matusz, Sjöholm, and Zhu (2012; 2014), and Helpman, Itskhoki, and 
Redding (2010) found robust empirical evidence that increased openness to international 
trade improves the positive assortative matching of skills in productivity, especially in 
industries with greater comparative advantage. This shows that globalization may enhance 
the effectiveness of positive assortative matching practices in the labor market.  
Almost all previous works assumed that firms within an industry are identical and 
labor markets are competitive; thus, they were concerned with sorting labor at cross-sectoral 
                                                                                                                                                        
includes such factors as physical traits, education, intelligence, religious beliefs, socioeconomic status, and 
political ideology (Bouchard & McGue, 1981; Escorial & Martín-Buro, 2012; Huber & Fieder, 2011; Kail & 
Cavanaugh, 2013, pp. 294; Wilson, 2000, pp. 80). A recent study on US census data by Greenwood, Guner, 
Kocharkov, and Santos (2014) found a rise in assortative mating in which the percentage of university graduates 
who married each other increased from 25% in 1960 to 48% in 2005. This produced divergence between highly 
educated and less educated groups, thus, magnifying the Gini coefficient of household income inequality from 
.34 to .43 (Greenwood et al., 2014). We suggest that this magnification effect is because of the O-ring effect of 
education on income.  
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level in order for sorting to be effective (Davidson et al., 2012). By extending the O-ring 
effect, our study analyses the role of globalization in moderating the impact of IQ on 
productivity at cross-country level. We question whether globalization has magnified the 
impact of national IQ on economic growth in previous decades. Through globalization in 
particular, national societies may encounter larger frameworks for economic freedom and be 
exposed to a more prolific network of complementary choices of ideas and skills. Through 
knowledge sharing across borders (Brown, Lauder, & Ashton, 2008), countries that open up 
their economic, social, and political frontiers will allow these complementary agents with 
similar levels of cognitive skills to collaborate through positive assortative matching, thus, 
enhancing collective IQ. Therefore, the O-ring theory should predict that globalization fosters 
collaboration between not only two high IQ agents, but also two low IQ agents. This is 
consistent with Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and Acemoglu (1999), that skill-biased 
technological change raises the productivity gap between high skill and low skill labor, thus 
amplifying the degree of positive assortative matching. In addition, a more globalized country 
would be exposed to positive externalities, with economic growth and innovation being 
dependent on knowledge spillover among agents (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1986). This occurs 
between two countries when agents with sufficient levels of absorptive capacity of 
knowledge (e.g., cognitive ability) learn from agents with more experience (Audretsch & 
Feldman, 2004; Caloghirou, Kastelli, & Tsakanikas, 2004; Carlino, 2001; Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1989, 1990; Lagerström & Andersson, 2003; Stuetzer, Obschonka, Brixy, 
Sternberg, & Cantner, 2014; Zahra & George, 2002). This may occur not only as a result of 
face-to-face interaction between laborers but also through cultural activities and social 
networking, whereby economic and geographic clusters integrate social capital and link it to 
economic prosperity (Porter, 1998, pp. 227; Porter, 2000; Staber, 2007). Therefore, by 
extending the O-ring effect, we examine whether globalization has produced a collective 
impact of IQ on economic growth rates at a cross-country level (see Figure 1), where 
economic growth centers on the interconnectivity of skills and intellectual ideas (Glaeser, 
1996).  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
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2. Globalization, IQ, and the O-ring Theory of Economic Development  
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) and Jones and Schneider (2010) revealed that cognitive 
ability is important more for groups than for individuals: a small difference in levels of 
cognitive ability causes a small difference between individuals’ wages within a country but is 
related to a large and permanent difference of private marginal product of labor across 
countries. Similar findings were established by Bils and Klenow (2000) and Krueger and 
Lindahl (2001), who employed education attainment (average years of schooling) instead of 
IQ scores and found that the schooling–productivity relationship was larger at a cross-country 
than at an individual level. In addition, the impact of human capital increments on growth 
was found to be greater among nations with larger wealth inequality. For instance, Hall and 
Jones (1999) found that the differences in productivity per worker between the five richest 
and five poorest countries produced a factor of 8.3, while the differences in workers’ 
education achievements within those regions produced a factor of only 2.2. These findings 
can be explained by the O-ring theory, which emphasizes the complementarities among 
inputs in production processes (Kremer, 1993). The theory asserts that tasks of production 
must be executed efficiently by all workers together in order for these to be of high value. 
The main feature of the O-ring theory is positive assortative matching, in which individuals 
with equivalent levels of skills work together. By treating workers’ skills as inputs in 
production, this theory postulates that skillful workers can augment productivity when their 
colleagues are also skillful workers, rather than if their colleagues’ skills are substandard. 
Lower IQ workers would gain more profit if they worked with higher IQ workers, but this 
would tend to lower the total productivity of the whole economy. Therefore, the O-ring 
theory suggests that it is more efficient for lower skilled workers to work with 
complementary lower skilled agents with equivalent levels of cognitive skills. We consider 
the case of two types of workers with IQ levels qL and qH, where qH>qL. Kremer (1993) 
assumed that for effective labor, qL=0.5qH and production output is a product of workers’ 
quality Y=q*q. With a fixed amount of workers and identical numbers of both types of 
workers, the O-ring theory suggests that it is more efficient to arrange workers into 
production in which all workers have the same quality:  
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Resulting from the O-ring effect, the impact of such skill complementarities has led to vast 
wage discrepancies between workers in two firms, even when their individual skills levels are 
only slightly different (Kremer, 1993). Jones (2011a, 2011b, 2013) extended this logic of O-
ring-type production technology to explain why a small cross-country difference in IQ is 
magnified into huge income differences across nations. Accordingly, a variation in the level 
of cognitive skills might not appear to be particularly significant for an individual’s income 
within a country, but the collective impact of a country’s IQ could cumulatively lead to very 
large productivity divergences across countries because those individuals work in clusters. 
By extending this issue, an additional question is raised: if many countries 
amalgamate and form a larger global community, is there a possibility that the impact of 
national IQ on productivity would also be amplified through the O-ring effect? The answer to 
this question could best be considered with the role of globalization in purporting to minimize 
the non-integrating gap between countries (Barnett, 2005), as well in fostering 
interconnectivity between civilizations, institutions, and societies, whereby the accelerating 
interdependence of countries in a world system is associated with economic activities via 
mass media and modern transportation (Kottak, 2011, pp. 396). Through increased 
specialization and the principle of comparative advantage (Bhagwati, 2004; Croucher, 2004), 
globalization has formed a larger global community and, consequently, developed advanced 
platforms for transnational circulation of culture, media, technology, finance, and exchange 
of ideas (Kottak, 2011, pp. 43), assuming that nonrivalry of ideas and knowledge are directed 
towards increasing returns to scale (Acemoglu, 1996; Romer, 1986, 1990). Such outcomes 
have created ―imagined communities‖ (Anderson, 2006), as cultures are not bound within 
specific regions but are distributed globally (Kottak, 2011, pp. 383), and societies can make 
use of the same reading materials and assimilate the same ideas without face-to-face 
communication (Appadurai, 1996, pp. 29; Gupta & Ferguson, 1992). Therefore, the degree of 
global community should refer not only to the degree of economic globalization but also to 
associated measures of social and political globalization. As specified by Dreher (2006) and 
Dreher, Gaston, and Martens (2008), globalization occurs via three dimensions: economic, 
social, and political. The authors of these studies define economic globalization as long 
distance flows of capital, goods, and services as well as information and perceptions 
associated with market exchanges; political globalization as the diffusion of government 
policies; and social globalization as the distribution of ideas, information, images, and people. 
These dimensions have led to global interconnectivity, integration, and interdependence 
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among individuals, knowledge, ideas, and skills in different countries. Altogether, people’s 
global interconnectivity positively induces a ―peer effect,‖ which enhances their productivity, 
as has been proved empirically in various fields of study, such as development studies (e.g., 
Foster & Rosenzweig, 1996; Godlonton & Thornton, 2012; Miguel & Kremer, 2004), 
education (e.g., Brunello, De Paola, & Scoppa, 2010; Carrell, Fullerton, & West, 2009; 
Rindermann & Heller, 2005), industrial organization (e.g., Aschhoff & Grimpe, 2012; Mas & 
Moretti, 2009), and labor (e.g., Kling, Liebman, & Katz, 2007; Owens 2012). Globalization is 
focused consistently on the swift development of science and technology and on increasing 
cross-country division of labor, which encourages countries to reduce trade barriers steadily 
and open up their current accounts and capital accounts (Shangquan, 2000). It involves the 
practice of economic freedom around the world. Gwartney and Lawson (2003) delineated 
four elements of economic freedom: (1) individual choice rather than group preference, (2) 
voluntary trade synchronized by markets rather than distribution through the political route, 
(3) self-determination to participate and compete in markets, and (4) protection of individuals 
and their possessions from the violence of other parties. These criteria for freedom would 
motivate individual agents to join the global framework and freely choose their most suitable 
complementary partners in the interests of mutual productivity. In our study, the strength of 
peoples’ interconnectivity is the basis for globalization moderating the impact of IQ on 
economic growth, with an assumption that individuals with equivalent levels of cognitive 
ability collaborate in clusters through positive assortative matching, which is consistent with 
the O-ring effect of skill complementarities. For this reason, whether globalization has 
increased the potential impact of national IQ on economic growth is precisely the question we 
attempted to answer.  
 
3. Methodology 
Based on the O-ring theory of economic development and theories of globalization, we 
constructed two assumptions (1 and 2) that generated a preconclusion (3) in our study: 
1. Within a country, individuals with specific levels of skills augment productivity when 
they team up with colleagues who have complementary levels of skills.  
2. Globalization intensifies people’s interconnectivity across countries and enables them 
to freely choose complementary skills that are mutually profitable and productive. 
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3. Based on Assumptions 1 and 2, greater globalization would amplify the impact of 
national average IQ on economic growth rates over time.  
To investigate the role of globalization in moderating the IQ–growth relationship, we 
employed a standard economic growth model as follows:  
                                                       
where the dependent variable is GROWTH, which denotes the average growth rate of real 
GDP per capita over the 1970–2010 period. Y1970 and IGDP are two control variables, initial 
GDP per capita in 1970 and investment as a percentage of annual GDP averaged over the 
years 1970–2010, respectively. These two control variables are employed in most standard 
growth models (e.g., Mankiw, Romer, & Weil, 1992; Minier, 2007; Ram, 2007). Data on 
GROWTH, Y1970, and IGDP were obtained from Penn World Table 7.1 (Heston, Summers, & 
Aten, 2012). IQ is the national average IQ for a specific country i, obtained from Meisenberg 
and Lynn (2011). In addition, we included X, which is a set of globalization variables to 
moderate growth through the impact of IQ on GROWTH. Lastly, ei is an error term. We 
hypothesized that the relationship between IQ and GROWTH would be affected by each 
value of X. Following Dawson (2014) and Zajenkowski, Stolarski, and Meisenberg (2013), 
we constructed an interaction term (IQ*X) that is the cross product of the two predictor 
variables. To overcome a collinearity problem between lower order terms and their 
interactions, we followed procedures suggested by Burhan, Mohamad, Kurniawan, and Sidek 
(2014b), Frazier, Tix, and Barron (2004), and Dawson (2014), in which all variables 
(GROWTH, Y1970, IGDP, IQ, and X) were standardized to a standard deviation of one. Then, 
we standardized the value of the interaction term (IQ*X) constructed from these standardized 
predictor values.  
Table 1 shows the list of countries ranked by selected variables. We employed a set of 
X’s representing the degree of globalization in terms of economic, political, and social 
integration. All data on globalization were obtained from the KOF Index of Globalization 
(Dreher, 2012), which was introduced originally by Dreher (2006) and was updated and 
described in detail in Dreher et al. (2008). We obtained annual values averaged for the years 
1970–2010. Each X was incorporated individually into the regression model as follows. 
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i. Economic globalization index, ECONOMIC 
This index was constructed from two subindexes, that is, actual flows and restrictions.  
ACTUAL_FLOWS refers to the subindex on actual economic flows and includes data on 
trade, portfolio investment, and stocks of foreign direct investment. In particular, trade is the 
total of a country’s exports and imports and portfolio investment is the total of a country’s 
stock of assets and liabilities normalized by gross domestic product (GDP). In addition, 
income payments to foreign nationals and capital were incorporated as a proxy for the degree 
to which a country employs foreigners in production activities.  
RESTRICTIONS refer to boundaries on trade and capital using hidden import barriers, mean 
tariff rates, taxes on international trade (as a share of current revenue), and an index of capital 
controls. Assigned a specified degree of trade, a country with more revenue from tariffs is 
considered to be less globalized. Nations were given lower ratings as their mean tariff rate 
rose. The rating dropped toward 0 as the mean tariff rate approached 50%.  
ii. Social globalization index, SOCIAL  
This index was constructed from three subindexes, that is, personal contacts, information 
flows, and cultural proximity:  
CONTACT measures direct interaction between populations of different nations. It includes 
international telecommunications traffic (in minutes per person) and number of tourists 
(incoming and outgoing) to which a national population is exposed. Government and 
workers’ transfers received and paid (as a percentage of GDP) indicate the extent to which 
nations interact, whereas the stock of foreign population was incorporated to measure 
existing interactions with society from other nations. In addition, the number of international 
letters received and sent captures direct interaction between populations living in different 
nations. 
INFORMATION measures the possible flow of ideas and images, including the number of 
internet users (per 100 people), the ratio of families with a television set, and international 
newspapers traded (as a percentage of GDP). All these indicators contribute to the global 
distribution of ideas because, to some extent, they signify the potential for receiving news 
from other nations. 
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CULTURAL includes the value of imported and exported books (relative to GDP) because 
traded books are a proxy for the extent to which beliefs and values circulate across a 
country’s borders. Furthermore, cultural globalization refers mainly to the dominance of US 
cultural products. Because the United States is a dominant force in the global sociocultural 
environment, cultural proximity includes the number of McDonald’s restaurants in a nation. 
For most populations, the global distribution of McDonald’s has become a symbol for 
globalization itself. In addition, the number of IKEA per country is used.  
iii. Political globalization index, POLITICAL  
This refers to the diffusion of government policies and includes the number of embassies and 
high commissions in a nation, the number of international organizations of which the nation 
is a member, and the number of peacekeeping missions conducted by the United Nations in 
which a nation participates. In addition, political globalization incorporates the number of 
agreements authorized between nations since 1945.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
4. Results  
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix for all variables. Table 3 shows correlation 
between IQ and economic growth in two separate groups of countries, that is, more 
globalized and less globalized countries. Accordingly, IQ–economic growth correlation was 
substantially higher in the less globalized region (r=.598–.668) than in the more globalized 
region (r=.159–.429). Figure 2 shows that the slopes for IQ–economic growth correlation 
were higher for less globalized than more globalized countries. These correlation values 
r=.64 for less globalized and r=.31 for more globalized countries were calculated based on 
Table 3 by averaging the six correlation values for each group.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
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Tables 4, 5, and 6 provide a summary of hierarchical multiple regression analyses. We 
used 26 models based on the inclusion and exclusion of the present variables. All models 
included Y1970 and IGDP but varied with regard to the inclusion of other variables and 
interaction terms. Principally, all models reveal a strong potency of IQ relative to other 
determinants of economic growth as IQ was significant (p<.01) in all regressions. According 
to Table 4, there was a substantial rise in adjusted R-squared between Model 1 (R
2
=.266) and 
Model 2 (R
2
=.551) after we accounted for national IQ in growth. In line with this, Model 2 
explained about 56.3% of the variation in economic growth, in which one standard deviation 
rise in IQ increased economic growth rates by a standard deviation of .782. When IQ and 
interaction terms were added into our estimations, POLITICAL (Model 5) and ECONOMIC 
(Model 8) maintained their significance at p<.01. SOCIAL (Models 9, 10 and 11) was 
nonsignificant in all models. Hence, POLITICAL and ECONOMIC are more essential for 
economic growth in comparison with SOCIAL. While IQ*SOCIAL (Model 11) was 
nonsignificant, we found that IQ*ECONOMIC (Model 8) was negatively significant at p<.05, 
while IQ*POLITICAL (Model 5) was negatively significant at p<.01 and increased the 
adjusted R
2
 from its lower order model. Accordingly, a rise in ECONOMIC and POLITICAL 
would reduce the impact of IQ on economic growth.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The next step was to separate the measure of economic globalization into actual flows 
and restrictions, as shown in Table 5. We found that ACTUAL_FLOWS and RESTRICTIONS 
were significant at the p<.01 level when the IQ and interaction terms were included together 
in the regressions (Models 3 and 6). Accordingly, a rise in actual flows would positively 
increase the economic growth rate, while a rise in restrictions would have a negative effect. 
This shows that the increase in the size of international trade as well as the removal of trade 
barriers tend to enhance economic growth. Furthermore, IQ*ACTUAL_FLOW was 
nonsignificant, while IQ*RESTRICTION was positively significant at the p<.05 level. 
Accordingly, an increase in RESTRICTION would raise the impact of IQ on economic 
growth. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
In addition, we separated the measure of social globalization into personal contacts, 
information flows, and cultural proximity. As shown in Table 6, we found that the 
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independent effect of CONTACT (Model 3), INFORMATION (Model 6), and CULTURAL 
(Model 9) were positively significant after the inclusion of IQ and interaction terms into the 
regressions. This indicates that an increase in the degree of personal contact, information 
flows, and cultural proximity between two or more countries will directly encourage more 
economic activities that enhance the cross-national growth of productivity. Furthermore, 
these three measures were significant moderators as they were negatively significant in 
moderating the impact of IQ on economic growth rates. This demonstrates that an inverse 
relationship exists between national IQ and personal contact, information flows, and cultural 
proximity on economic growth.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
5. Discussion 
The main objective of our study was to examine the effect of globalization and its role 
in moderating the impact of national IQ on economic growth. The study established that IQ 
rather than economic, political, or social globalization has the strongest impact on economic 
growth. Among the factors of globalization, we found that the independent effects of political 
globalization, actual flows, personal contact, information flows, and cultural proximity on 
economic growth were significantly positive; and the effect of restrictions was significantly 
negative. In addition, we found that political globalization, personal contact, information 
flows, and cultural proximity were significantly negative in moderating the effect of national 
IQ on growth, while economic restrictions were a positively significant moderator. Actual 
flows were a nonsignificant moderator. Furthermore, the magnitudes of the all interaction 
terms were smaller than their lower order predictors independently.  
Our study was conceptualized based on Kremer’s O-ring theory of economic 
development and the various theories of globalization. Accordingly, individuals with given 
levels of skills can enhance productivity when they work with colleagues who have 
complementary levels of skills through positive assortative matching of cognitive skills. By 
maintaining the principles of globalization that foster interconnectivity between people across 
nations, we deduced that globalization could serve as an essential platform for societies of 
different countries to communicate and freely choose their complementary skills for mutual 
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profit and productivity. Therefore, we proposed that greater globalization would positively 
magnify the IQ–growth relationship. However, our empirical findings were in contrast to our 
hypothesis: we found that components of globalization did reduce the impact of IQ on 
economic growth during 1970–2010.  
Based on our findings, we deduce that globalization in the previous four decades has 
not strengthened but weakened the collective impact of IQ on economic growth at the cross-
country level. We propose two possible underlying mechanisms that might serve to explain 
this phenomenon. First, positive assortative matching of cognitive skills has not been all 
embracing within the globalization process. The practice of free will through globalization 
has not fostered cognitive skill complementarities comprehensively among global 
populations with different political backgrounds and cultures, but instead has worsened the 
positive assortative matching of IQ on economic growth across countries. This occurs where 
positive assortative matching may be impeded by the existence of friction in the matching 
market (Shimer & Smith, 2000). Theoretically, in a matching market with the presence of 
ideally positive assortative matching, the discrepancy in probability of success between the 
two complementary agents would approach zero. Therefore, in the presence of friction, a 
discrepancy in the probability of success between two complementary agents would deviate 
from zero to the discrepancies in mean probability of success separating the two demographic 
groups (Shimer & Smith, 2000; Smith, 2006). Moreover, through globalization, there are 
large numbers and types of agents that participate in the matching market, and they all seek 
high earnings and productivity. However, in each matching round, to match with their peers 
across countries, it may occur that there are more types of peers than the number of matching 
rounds, which leads to sorting inefficiency in the matching market (Damiano, Li, & Suen, 
2005). Furthermore, it may be that most agents participate more in comparatively 
disadvantaged industries than in comparatively advantaged industries. This trend has been 
observed in Davidson et al. (2008; 2014), whereby positive assortative matching increases in 
comparatively advantaged industries but it decreases in comparatively disadvantaged 
industries; this imperfect matching causes productivity losses (Hsieh & Klenow, 2009).  
Second, it could be that the forces of international neoliberal politics and 
multiculturalism policies through globalization have resulted in the widening of 
socioeconomic inequalities within a national society, and consequently, led to loss of its 
social cohesion (Ariely, 2012; Barry, 2001, pp. 88; Coburn, 2000, 2004; Green, Janmaat, & 
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Cheng, 2011; Green, Preston, & Janmaat, 2006, pp. 4). Social cohesion concerns how 
positively individuals in a group bond to one another (Lockwood, 1992, 1999) by sharing 
collective values and purpose in a society, and having a sense of belonging and solidarity for 
individuals from various backgrounds (Cheong, Edwards, Goulbourne, & Solomos, 2007). 
Socioeconomic equalities make individuals feel to some extent that they are in the same boat, 
which are fundamentals of a collective solidarity connecting not just individuals but also 
national citizens (Ranci, 2011). Individuals prefer and trust others with whom they share 
similar characteristics (McPherson & Smith-Lovin, 2002; Uslaner, 2003). Therefore, the 
widening of socioeconomic inequalities owing to globalization will simply weaken the social 
cohesion of a society (Eraydin, 2008; Ratcliffe & Newman, 2011; Robinson, 2013; Turok, 
2005). We suggest that this may occur through increasing social and cultural disparity and 
differences in political ideologies between individuals with similar IQ levels, which makes 
trusting and tolerance harder, and subsequently, discourages cooperation or assortative 
matching of cognitive skills among these individuals. In line with this discussion, our 
arguments on friction in the matching market, cognitive skill-sorting inefficiencies, and 
socioeconomic inequality induced by globalization may explain why the positive impact of 
national IQ on economic growth has been declining at cross-country level. We suggest that it 
would be insightful for future studies to analyze these mechanisms so that societies may 
utilize globalization as a useful channel to boost the impact of national IQ on economic 
growth.  
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Table 1 
List of countries with top- and bottom-10 rankings for selected variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: All variables are unstandardized values. 
 
 
 
GDP Growth (%), 
GROWTH (N=122) 
National IQ, IQ 
(N=122) 
Political Globalization, 
POLITICAL (N=122) 
Economic Globalization, 
ECONOMIC (N=113) 
Social Globalization, 
SOCIAL (N=120) 
10 Countries 
at Highest 
Ranking 
1. China: 7.85 
2. S. Korea: 5.89 
3. Macau: 5.68 
4. Singapore: 5.36 
5. Botswana: 5.27 
6. Malaysia: 4.65 
7. Malta: 4.60 
8. Thailand: 4.28 
9. Mauritius: 4.24 
10. Vietnam: 4.20 
 
 
1. Singapore: 106.9 
2. China: 105.9 
3. S. Korea: 104.8 
4. Japan: 104.1 
5. Finland: 100.8 
6. Canada: 100.4 
7. Netherlands: 100.4 
8. Mongolia: 100.0 
9. Macau: 99.9 
10. N. Zealand: 99.3 
 
 
1. Canada: 83.8 
2. Singapore: 83.2 
3. Switzerland: 82.8 
4. Sweden: 77.2 
5. Austria: 77.0 
6. Netherlands: 76.3 
7. Denmark: 75.3 
8. Belgium: 74.9 
9. Australia: 74.4 
10. U. Kingdom: 73.6 
 
 
1. Luxembourg: 94.9 
2. Singapore: 92.3 
3. Ireland: 88.2 
4. Belgium: 87.6 
5. Netherlands: 85.9 
6. Bahrain: 78.9 
7. Denmark: 78.1 
8. Switzerland: 75.9 
9. Sweden: 73.4 
10. Norway: 72.4 
 
  
1. U. Kingdom: 96.4 
2. France: 95.5 
3. Sweden: 94.6 
4. Belgium: 93.7 
5. Italy: 92.7 
6. Denmark: 92.3      
7. Austria: 91.9 
8. Netherlands: 91.6    
9. Canada: 90.0 
10. USA: 89.6 
  
  
10 Countries 
at Lowest 
Ranking 
113. Jamaica: .08 
114. Zambia: .01 
115. Cote d’Ivoire: -.13 
116. Burundi: -.16 
117. Nicaragua: -.56 
118. Comoros: -.80 
119. Madagascar: -1.17 
120. Centr. Af. R.: -1.21 
121. Niger: -1.27 
122. Congo DR: -2.43 
113. Cameroon: 68.2 
114. Congo DR: 68 
115. Benin: 67.7 
116. Chad: 67.1 
117. Guinea: 66.5 
118. Sierra Leone: 64 
119. Centr. Afr. R.: 64 
120. Gambia: 62.0 
121. Malawi: 61.9 
122. Niger: 61.2 
113. Guinea: 14.9 
114. Sierra Leone: 14.4 
115. Centr. Af. R.: 13.3 
116. Mali: 13.3 
117. Laos: 13.1 
118. Niger: 12.1 
119. Bangladesh: 12.1 
120. Congo DR:10.7 
121. Ethiopia: 10.4 
122. Chad: 10.1 
104. Uganda: 26.6   
105. India: 25.9 
106. Centr. Afr. R.: 25.1   
107. Madagascar: 24.5 
108. Sudan: 21.7 
109. Iran: 21.5 
110. Nepal: 18.9 
111. Burundi: 18.6 
112. Bangladesh: 16.5 
113. Rwanda: 16.0 
111. Oman: 33.9 
112. Papua NG: 33.5       
113. Belize: 32.9 
114. Bahrain: 31.9 
115. Botswana: 31.6 
116. Suriname: 30.2 
117. Lesotho: 28.8 
118. Swaziland: 28.3   
119. Laos: 27.3  
120. Comoros: 24.0 
25 
 
Table 2  
Correlation matrix for all variables. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. GROWTH  -           
2. Y1970  -.031 -          
3. IGDP  .570** .164 -         
4. IQ  .501** .674** .469** -        
5. POLITICAL  .208* .860** .225* .733** -       
6. ECONOMIC  .257** .738** .310** .614** .862** -      
7. ACTUAL_FLOW  .177 .498** .280** .314** .595** .850** -     
8. RESTRICTIONS  -.264** -.778** -.265** -.732** -.893** -.887** -.513** -    
9. SOCIAL  .050 .532** -.017 .558** .550** .378** .089 -.541** -   
10. CONTACT  .131 .764** .176 .503** .886** .826** .683** -.757** .309** -  
11. INFORMATION  .236* .848** .286** .739** .948** .828** .589** -.843** .495** .825** - 
12. CULTURAL  .190 .736** .158 .729** .892** .706** .377** -.826** .677** .645** .763** 
 
*p<.05  
**p<.01  
26 
 
Table 3  
Correlations between IQ and economic growth in more globalized and less globalized countries; median-splits.  
 Globalization Index 
 
POLITICAL 
ECONOMIC SOCIAL 
 ACTUAL_FLOW RESTRICTIONS CONTACT INFORMATION CULTURAL 
Correlation, r 
More globalized 
Countries 
.307* .309* .224 .329* .159 .429** 
Less globalized 
Countries 
.680** .668* .659** .662** .663** .598** 
 
*p<.05  
**p<.01  
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Table 4 
Summary of growth regression analysis where political globalization, economic globalization, and social globalization acts as moderators.  
Note: Regression coefficients are standardized betas. All regressions are estimated using White heteroskedasticity correction. All regressions include a constant term.  
 
*p<.05
 
 
**p<.01 
Dependent Variable: GROWTH (GDP Growth Rates, % (1970–2010)) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Y1970 -.105 -.567** -.679** -.813** -.915** -.408** -.765** -.791** -.212* -.548** -.531** 
IGDP .543** .300** .485** .298** .217* .518** .291** .231* .560** .291** .285** 
IQ  .782**  .692** .628**  .709** .724**  .808** .794** 
POLITICAL   .682** .357* .612**       
ECONOMIC      .411** .306** .367**    
SOCIAL         .171 -.100 -.078 
IQ*POLITICAL     -.257**       
IQ*ECONOMIC        -.131*    
IQ*SOCIAL           .068 
            
N 122 122 122 122 122 113 113 113 120 120 120 
R-squared .278 .563 .395 .591 .633 .406 .613 .626 .310 .577 .580 
Adjusted 
R-squared 
.266 .551 .379 .577 .618 .390 .599 .609 .292 .562 .561 
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Table 5 
Summary of growth regression analysis where economic globalization (actual flows and 
restrictions) acts as moderators. 
 
Note: Regression coefficients are standardized betas. All regressions are estimated using White 
heteroskedasticity correction. All regressions include a constant term.  
*p<.05 
**p<.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: GROWTH (GDP Growth Rates, % (1970–2010)) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Y1970 -.208* -.735** -.740** -.507** -.693** -.698** 
IGDP .532** .272** .262* .534** .337** .279** 
IQ  .809** .813**  .631** .610** 
ACTUAL_FLOW .099 .201** .206**    
RESTRICTION    -.526** -.260* -.350** 
IQ*ACTUAL_FLOW   -.028    
IQ*RESTRICTION      .163* 
       
N 114 114 114 109 109 109 
R-squared .297 .603 .603 .461 .594 .613 
Adjusted 
R-squared 
.278 .588 .585 .445 .578 .594 
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Table 6 
Summary of growth regression analysis where social globalization (personal contacts, information flows, and cultural proximity) acts as 
moderators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Regression coefficients are standardized betas. All regressions are estimated using White heteroskedasticity correction. All regressions include a constant term.   
*p<.05
 
**p<.01 
Dependent Variable: GROWTH (GDP Growth Rates, % (1970–2010)) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Y1970 -.299* -.824** -.828** -.656** -.816** -.829** -.423** -.597** -.649** 
IGDP .553** .296** .235** .482** .313** .255** .547** .323** .306** 
IQ  .796** .807**  .661** .647**  .763** .638** 
CONTACT .220 .299** .358**       
INFORMATION    .682** .392** .457**    
CULTURAL       .403** .104 .322* 
IQ*CONTACT   -.150*       
IQ*INFORMATION      -.149*    
IQ*CULTURAL         -.250** 
          
N 119 119 119 118 118 118 120 120 120 
R-squared .318 .607 .625 .438 .617 .624 .364 .571 .595 
Adjusted 
R-squared 
.300 .594 .608 .423 .593 .607 .347 .556 .578 
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Figure 1. The possible role of globalization in moderating the impact of national IQ on 
economic growth rates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intelligence Economic growth 
Globalization 
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Figure 2. Slopes for average IQ–economic growth correlations, r for two country samples 
separated by the level of globalization (i.e., below and above median-split).  
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